Assad’s ‘ethnic cleansing’ plan unveils a new Syria

As food, medicine, water and fuel supplies dwindle, pressure mounts on civilians and fighters to surrender.

Residents of Qusayr waving Syrian national flag and Hezbollah’s flag


2017/01/08 Issue: 88 Page: 8


The Arab Weekly
Nicholas Blanford



Beirut - A hallmark of the Syrian re­gime’s policy to recover territory held by rebel groups is the surrender-or-starve tactic, a brutal binary choice for the defenders of opposition-held towns and neigh­bourhoods across western Syria that has paid dividends for President Bashar Assad and his multinational allies.

Access points in and out of the tar­geted area are sealed by regime forc­es and the population is subjected to intense aerial and artillery bom­bardment. As food, medicine, water and fuel supplies dwindle, pressure mounts on civilians and fighters to surrender.

The recent six-month siege and relentless bombardment of east­ern Aleppo, with a population of 200,000 people, was the acme of this uncompromising tactic.

These deals — known in regime-speak as “reconciliation agree­ments” to disguise a tactic that many consider to be a war crime — are more commonplace than is gen­erally appreciated.

The Russian Defence Ministry’s Centre for Reconciliation of Oppos­ing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic said that, as of mid-December, the number of “reconciliation agree­ments” secured across Syria stood at 1,057, with another 94 ceasefire deals.

As the world looked on while Aleppo, once Syria’s economic hub, was battered into rubble, the Assad regime was pursuing the same pol­icy elsewhere, notably on Damas­cus’s periphery.

In October, Assad’s forces launched an offensive against re­bel-held Khan al-Sheikh, a town in Western Ghouta that sits on the key highway linking Damascus to Daraa in the south. By the end of the month, the town was surrounded and had been hammered by dozens of barrel-bomb assaults and rocket barrages.

On November 19th, an agreement was reached in which the popula­tion would be allowed to go to Idlib province in the north, a rebel strong­hold. Rebels also could leave after surrendering their heavy weapons.

About 3,000 people, half of them militants, left Khan al-Sheikh in late November. Rebels in four nearby vil­lages also cut deals with the regime and departed for Idlib, leaving the area firmly in Assad’s grip for the first time since the uprising against his rule began in March 2011.

In mid-November, before the eastern Aleppo evacuation deal had been brokered, dozens of Hezbollah fighters were mobilised in the Sara­fand area of southern Lebanon and deployed to Syria to lead an assault to break the rebel siege of Kefraya and Fouaa, two Shia villages in Idlib, sources close to the party said.

Kefraya and Fouaa are already part of a ceasefire deal with Zabada­ni and Madaya, rebel towns near the Lebanese border that are besieged by Hezbollah. If the assault to re­lieve Kefraya and Fouaa had been successful, Hezbollah intended to storm Zabadani and Madaya, the sources said.

Zabadani lies close to Shia-popu­lated villages and sensitive Hezbol­lah-controlled locations on the Leb­anese side of the border. That makes its return to Syrian state control imperative for the Iranian-backed movement.

However, the planned assault was apparently overtaken by events in Aleppo when a deal was struck by Turkey and Russia to allow the pop­ulation in the eastern sector to leave for Idlib.

Iran and Hezbollah objected, de­manding that Zabadani, Madaya, Fouaa and Kefraya be included in the deal.

It is unclear whether the ex­panded deal will be implemented but the surrender-or-starve policy and subsequent evacuations of be­sieged populations raises the ques­tion what will happen to the towns, villages and neighbourhoods in the future.

Will their people be allowed to re­turn if the war ends?

A pointer may lie in what hap­pened in Qusayr, a mainly Sunni town in Homs province 8km from the Lebanese border. In June 2013, Hezbollah seized the town. The Sun­nis and rebel fighters fled.

Qusayr is now an important Hez­bollah military base and staging point for deployments deeper into Syria. Recruits use the ruins to train for urban warfare.

Several villages west of the town have been populated by Lebanese Shias for decades. To all intents and purposes, Qusayr and nearby vil­lages have effectively become an extension of Lebanon’s northern Bekaa valley, Hezbollah’s heartland.

As things stand, it is doubtful whether the Sunni residents will ever fully return to Qusayr. The same could hold for Zabadani and Madaya if a deal is reached that al­lows for their evacuation along the well-trodden path to Idlib, which is fast becoming a refuge for Sunnis from across Syria.

Even some Damascus neighbour­hoods have seen effective popu­lation transfers, such as Daraya, where 10,000 people left in August, and Moadamiyeh ash-Sham, both of which surrendered after four-year sieges.

The Syrian opposition has long ac­cused the Damascus regime of seek­ing to reduce the Sunni presence in western Syria to strengthen Assad’s grip on the routes linking Damascus to Latakia on the northern coast.

Nevertheless, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah on December 23rd said the Assad regime does not seek to impose “demographic changes” in Syria.

“Armed groups were behind the demographic changes that hap­pened,” he claimed, adding that people driven out of Aleppo and Daraya would eventually return to their homes.

Whether those displaced Sunnis are indeed allowed to return to their homes remains to be seen — as does whether they would wish to if Assad remained in power.


Nicholas Blanford is the author of Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle Against Israel (Random House 2011). He lives in Beirut.


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